This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in a market where those rms that obtain at least one licence then engage in a symmetric market game. I employ a new re nement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of Markovian recursively undominated e quilibrium. The unique solution satis es the following properties: (i) when several rms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buy licences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent, either the single rm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the parameter con guration.
Introduction
This paper studies auctions of licences to operate in a market. Since the outcome of an auction partly determines the market structure that will emerge after the auction, this setting seems appropriate to address interesting questions about entry preemption and the persistence of certain market structures in the face of entry. The relationship between auction procedures and resulting market structure was seriously addressed in practice by regulators and auction designers during the recent F CC auctions of radio spectrum bands. More generally, a n y auction of licences or productive capacity raises similar issues and can be addressed within the present analysis.
Entry preemption and the persistence of monopoly have received considerable attention in the Industrial Organization literature Newberry, 1982 Dasgupta et al., 1983) . It has been argued that a monopoly will persist even when new capacity becomes available. Because in a non-cooperative e n vironment aggregate industry pro ts decrease with entry, the total cost of entry to the incumbents is larger than the bene t to the entrant. If a single incumbent has to bear this entire cost, it will be willing to pay more to avoid entry than the potential entrants are willing to pay to accomplish it. Therefore, a monopolist is expected to engage in preemptive investment to avoid entry.
However, Krishna (1993) shows that this argument, initially formulated in a static framework, does not necessarily extend to the dynamic case. She studies the persistence of monopoly in the context of a sequential auction of capacity. For a large class of demand speci cations, she singles out an equilibrium outcome in which e n try occurs in every stage except the last. Her analysis, however, relies on a fundamentally asymmetric formulation: in the market that emerges after the auction, except for a price setting monopolist, all the remaining rms behave as price takers. It is apparent that this may not be consistent with Nash equilibrium in the post-auction market game unless the capacity units auctioned are small relative t o t h e size of the market.
In this paper, I study sequential auctions of licences in the case in which a symmetric market structure emerges after the auction. I suppose that each rm that ends the auction with at least one licence will engage in a symmetric market game. For example, symmetric scenarios in which the post-auction market game is either a Cournot or a Bertrand game are consistent with our formulation. Note that the symmetry assumption implies that licences are unrestricted: a rm that has a single licence is entitled to sell as much output as it wishes or equivalently, in an auction of capacity units this implies that the units auctioned are large: a rm that owns a single capacity unit can serve the whole market. Although in this model rms that own units do not need additional units to expand their production, they may still wish to obtain more units simply to preempt entry by other rms.
The analysis had to cope with two main obstacles: the enormous multiplicity of equilibria characteristic of many dynamic games and the presence of externalities. Rodr guez (1994) shows that the indeterminacy that arises in many sequential auctions cannot bee ectively reduced by standard re nements of Nash equilibrium. The concept of Markovian recursively undominated (MRU) equilibrium developed in that paper is appropriate for the present application. Brie y, an MRU equilibrium is a Markovian equilibrium in which t h e p l a yers do not use locally dominated choices. I s a y that a c hoice prescribed by a strategy pro le to a g i v en player at a given stage and history is locally dominated at that stage and history if it is weakly dominated in the game obtained by substituting the subgames starting at the next stage by the corresponding payo vectors under the pro le in question. By requiring that the players do not employ locally dominated choices, this concept imposes a strong strategic stability requirement locally at each stage and conditional on each history. However, this requirement is consistent with recursive construction of a solution, which results in considerable simpli cation of the analysis.
Externalities are present here since a rm's payo depends not only on whether this rm obtains a licence to enter the market, but also on the total numberof rms that manage to enter. Although these externalities may result in non-uniqueness, I i d e n tify conditions on the rate at which pro ts decrease with entry that eliminate the indeterminacy and are satis ed in an interesting class of economic environments. A brief summary of the main results follows. The MRU allocation is unique and independent of whether the auction is a rst or a second price sequential auction. When there is more than one incumbent rm before the auction, new entrants will buy licences in every stage. On the other hand, when there is at most one initial incumbent, either a single rm preempts entry completely or entry occurs in each stage. Which case will prevail depends on the sign of a parameter that will, in equilibrium, beequal to the net bene t to a monopolist of complete preemption.
These results rely on the assumption that in the market that emerges after the auction pro ts decrease with entry, but the rate at which they decrease is not too large. In particular, this assumption is satis ed when rms have a constant returns technology, the market demand is concave and the post-auction market game is a symmetric Cournot game. In fact, even sharper results are available in this particular case. I show that when the numberof units auctioned is large enough, entry will necessarily occur in every stage, a result that contrasts with the persistence of monopoly that prevails in the static case. It suggests that a government can always approximate a competitive solution by auctioning a suciently large number of licences. However, I also show that a revenue maximizing seller will in many cases prefer to o er only the largest numberof units that is consistent with complete preemtion by a monopolist.
Another scenario amenable to treatment b y these methods is the case of rms with a constant returns technology that engage in a symmetric Bertrand game after the auction. In this case, however, the net bene t of complete pre-emption is always positive so that the completely preemptive outcome prevails, as in the static case.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I lay out the model and introduce the solution concept. In section 3 I analyze a Cournot game that is consistent with the basic assumptions of the model about the market that emerges after the auction. Section 4 derives the main results about the auction. Most proofs are included in the appendix.
The Model
In this section I lay out the model of sequential auctions of licences and introduce the solution concept that will be used.
Suppose that t licences to operate in a market are auctioned sequentially among n rms. Two alternative auction procedures will be considered: sequential rst price auctions and sequential second price auctions. Firms that own licences before the auction are called incumbents. Although rms that already have a licence do not need more licences to increase their operation, they may still want to buy additional licences to prevent other rms from entering the market. Any rm that owns at least one licence after the auction ends has the right to operate without restrictions in the market that emerges. Note that not only the market game that is expected to be played among incumbents and new entrants determines the bidders' valuations, but also the outcome of the auction itself partly determines the ensuing market structure.
Notation and Basic Assumptions
I model the auction as a multistage game of complete information and observable histories. Let N = f1 :: ng be the set of players ( rms) and T = f1 : : t g be the set of units auctioned sequentially, where n > t. I assume that the bidding space B is a set of nonnegative multiples of a small money unit u. Denote b r = (b i1 :: b i r;1 ) and a r = (a i1 : : a i r;1 ). Thus, the history up to the rth stage is h r = (b r a r ). Let H r denote the set of all the histories up to r and de ne H = \ 2T H . I assume that histories are publicly observable. Each history h r 2 H r determines an allocation of units a r and a set I r = I r (a r ) of players that own at least one unit at the beginning of stage r. In particular, I 1 is the set of incumbent rms prior to the auction and I t+1 is the composition of the industry after the auction. I assume without loss of generality that there is at least one r m i n t h e market before the auction starts, i.e.:jI 1 j 1.
Let w ir denote the amount paid by player i in the rth stage. Also denote w r i = ( w i1 : : w i r;1 ) a n d w r = ( w r i ) i2N . For a given allocation (a t+1 w t+1 ), player i's payo is represented by the quasi-linear function u i (a t+1 w t+1 i ) = i (a t+1 ) ; P 2T w i , where the revenue i (a t+1 ) is induced by the outcome of the market game that follows the auction.
I assume that players who own at least one unit engage in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric market game. This presupposes that licences are unrestricted: a rm that has a single licence is entitled to sell as much output as it wishes. On the other hand, players that do not own any licence after the auction ends will not be able to enter the industry. Consequently, the equilibrium pro ts of each rm in the industry can be written as a function (jI t+1 j) of the total numberjI t+1 j of rms in the industry , so we h a ve t h a t i (a t+1 ) = (jI t+1 (a t+1 )j) when i 2 I t+1 (a t+1 ), and i (a t+1 ) = 0 otherwise. We assume that the function satis es the following conditions: Note that assumption (A 1 ) requires that total industry pro ts do not increase with entry, and that (A 2 ) puts an upper bound on the rate at which individual rms' pro ts decrease with entry. In section 2 we will see that these assumptions are actually satis ed by an important class of economic environments.
Solution Concept
In this subsection I de ne the solution concept used for the analysis of the sequential auction. A more complete discussion of this topic is found in Rodriguez 7] . It is shown in there that the standard re nements of Nash equilibrium fail to select a plausible and determinate solution for nite multistage auctions even in simple cases. The concept of MRU equilibrium is developed there to provide a tractable analytical tool and preserve the predictive p o wer of the model. Using the logic of backwards induction, this concept provides a rather simple extension to a dynamic setting of the concept of Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies which is often applied to static auctions.
Before I provide a precise de nition of the solution concept, I introduce some related concepts. A behavior strategy for player i is a map i : H ! (B) where ( B) denotes the set of probability distributions on the bidding space B. Let u ir (h r ) denote player i's expected payo gross of payments prior to stage r and conditional on the history h r provided that the players use the pro le = ( i ) i2N in the subgame determined by h r . More explicitly, u ir (h r ) = E h u i (a t+1 w t+1 i ) j h r i + P r;1 =1 w i where E is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution induced by . In particular, if the players select bids b r = ( b ir ) i2N at the history h r and bid according to the pro le after the stage r, their expected payo s (gross of payments prior to r) are u i r+1 (h r b r ) ; w ir , for each i 2 N. Given and h r , these payo s de ne a static game where the bidders' strategies are their bids at r. I refer to this game as the local auction of the rth unit at h r given . I say that a bid for the rth unit is locally dominated at h r given if it is weakly dominated in the local auction of the rth unit at h r given :I also say that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is recursively undominated if none of the choices prescribed (with positive probability) by to any player is locally dominated at its corresponding stage and history given .
By ruling out locally dominated strategies, this restriction imposes a strong local strategic stability requirement a t e a c h h i s t o r y . Moreover, since a local auction at h r given depends on only through the local strategies prescribed for subsequent stages, this concept is recursive in nature, which simpli es the analysis considerably. Existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium that is recursively undominated for the games considered in this paper is a direct consequence of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies for nite games since each local auction is a nite game (Van Damme, 1991) .
Moreover, I will restrict my attention to equilibria that are Markovian, a condition often used in the literature and that seems rather natural in the present context. I should say that although this condition simpli es somewhat the treatment, it is actually not restrictive in the present case.
The payo relevant partition of the set of histories H is the partition of H into sets that contain all the histories that de ne strategically equivalent subgames. A behavior strategy is Markovian if it is measurable with respect to the payo relevant partition (i.e.: i (h) = i (h 0 ) w h e n e v er h and h 0 de ne strategically equivalent subgames). A Markovian equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which all the players employ M a r k ovian strategies. In our case, the Markovian assumption implies that histories that project the same allocation of units determine strategically equivalent subgames. To see this, consider two historiesĥ r andh r that project the same allocation of units, i.e.:â r = a r . Note that for every allocation (a r : : a t w ir :: w it ) i2N we have that u i (â r a r : : a t ŵ r i w ir :: w it ) + P r;1 =1ŵ i = u i (ã r a r :: a t w r i w ir : : w it ) + P r;1 =1w i . In other words, for every i 2 N, u i induces the same preference ordering among allocations for the subgames determined byĥ r andh r . Thus, both subgames are strategically equivalent and all the players will behave identically in each of them at every Markovian equilibrium. The Markovian assumption allows us to de ne an array of recursive valuations associated to a strategy pro le. Given the pro le , I de ne player i's recursive valuations for the rth unit at h r as v ij (h r ) = u i r+1 (h r a r =i ) ; u i r+1 (h r a r =j ): This can be interpreted as the amount that player i has to pay for the rth unit at h r in order to beindi erent between obtaining the unit and allowing player j to obtain it instead, provided that all the players use the pro le after period r. In section 4 we will see that recursive v aluations provide a c o n venient characterization of local auctions and locally dominated choices. Now, I can de ne the solution concept that will be employed in the analysis of the sequential auction. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential auction that is bothMarkovian and recursively undominated will becalled an MRU equilibrium, which is short for Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium. An allocation determined by an MRU equilibrium will be called an MRU allocation. Existence of an MRU equilibrium for multistage games with observed actions is a trivial consequence of the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium that is recursively undominated.
3 The Post-Auction Market Game
In the preceding section I have characterized the market that emerges after the auction in terms of a pro t function that satis es conditions A 1 and A 2 . Here I address the question of whether such a pro t function is consistent with the equilibrium correspondence of any reasonable market game. More speci cally, I investigate conditions under which the Nash equilibria of a symmetric Cournot game satisfy A 1 and A 2 .
Consider an industry in which m rms produce a homogeneous good using the same constant returns to scale technology. Their cost of production is represented by the function c(q) = cq for some constant c 0: Suppose that they can sell their total output Q at a price consistent with the inverse demand function p(Q). I assume that this function is bounded, non-increasing and continuously di erentiable in (0 1): Moreover, p(0) > 0 a n d p( Q) = 0 for some Q > 0: It also satis es either one of the following assumptions:
(M 2 ) the restriction of p to 0 Q] is a concave function.
I suppose that rms engage in a Cournot game. It is well known that there is a unique Cournot equilibrium for the preceding problem (Friedman, 1982) Lemma 1 Suppose that the inverse demand function satis es condition M 1 :
Then the unique Cournot equilibrium must satisfy the following properties:
(i) Q m < Q m+1 m = 1 2 : : (ii) satisfies condition A 1: (iii) 2 (m + 1 ) > (m) m = 3 4 : : :
We conclude that the concavity of total revenues required by condition M 1 not only ensures that assumption A 1 holds, but also ensures that the conditions required by assumption A 2 are satis ed for m > 2. To guarantee that these conditions are also satis ed for m = 2 we may need a stronger assumption. The following example shows that conditions A 1 and A 2 are satis ed when the demand function is linear.
Example 1 (Linear Demand) Suppose that p(Q) = a ; bQ. In this case, equation (2) In fact, it can be shown that all concave demand functions satisfy both A 1 and A 2 . Since M 2 implies M 1 , that A 1 is satis ed follows from the preceding lemma. Consider the case of A 2 . Suppose that p is strictly concave. Let p l denote the tangent to p at the quantity Q m . Clearly, p l is a linear demand function and the corresponding Cournot equilibrium satis es Q l = Q m and l (m) = (m) : Moreover, since total output increases with entry by Lemma 1, we k n o w that both Q m+1 and Q l are larger than Q m . The strict concavity of p implies both that p l is more elastic than p at each quantity Q > Q m and also that the elasticity of p decreases as the output increases. We must conclude that rms produce less at the Cournot equilibrium corresponding to the demand function that is less elastic at the relevant range. Thus, Q m+1 < Q l : But since total pro ts decrease in Q at outputs larger than the monopoly level Q 1 , w e m ust also conclude that (m + 1 ) > l (m+1 ) .Consequently, (m);2 (m+1 )< l (m);2 l (m+1 )< 0 f o r m > 1, where the second inequality follows from example 1. This argument establishes somewhat informally the rst statement of the following lemma (A more detailed proof is included in the appendix). 
Preliminary Remark: Externalities
A particularity of the auctions that we study here is that some rms' payo s may exhibit externalities. The bidders' payo s in the auction are induced by their expected pro ts in the ensuing market game and, typically, these pro ts depend on the total number of rms in the market. Therefore, each bidder's payo depends not only on whether he obtains a licence to operate in the market, but also on the total number of rms that own licences. For instance, if at some point during the auction several rms own licences, each one of these incumbent rms would rather have other incumbents buy the remaining licences than allowing a reduction of pro ts due to new entry. As a result of these externalities, some of the incumbents' valuations may not be uniquely de ned: they may depend on whether they expect another incumbent or a new entrant to be the highest bidder for the unit in question. An example illustrates this matter.
Example 2 (Static Second Price Auction) A single licence is sold using a second price auction. jI 1 j incumbent rms and n; j I 1 j potential new entrants participate in the auction. Firms that own at least one licence a r e e x p ected to engage in a Cournot game after the auction. Since bidders' valuations may n o t b e uniquely de ned d u e t o t h e presence of externalities, Lemma 1 implies that undominated outcomes may benon-unique. However, one can single out a case in which externalities do not preclude uniqueness of the undominated Nash equilibrium allocation. Lemma 4 Consider a single-unit auction whose valuations-matrix displays Determinate High Values. Denote V 1 = fi 2 N : v i = v 1 g. Then, independently of whether the auction is a F P A or a S PA , at every undominated N a s h e quilibrium, each i 2 V 1 participates in the tie-breaker and the winner pays a price p = v 2 , an approximation that becomes exact as the money unit u tends to 0.
2
In Example 2 the unique undominated choice for a new entrant i consists in bidding v i = (jI 1 j + 1 ) . When jI 1 j = 1, the only incumbent, say bidder j, knows that his failure to obtain the licence would necessarily result in entry, so his valuation also is uniquely de ned by v j = (jI 1 j); (jI 1 j + 1 ) : Since in this case all the valuations are uniquely de ned and v j ; v i = (jI 1 j) ; 2 (jI 1 j + 1 ) > 0 by assumption A 1 we conclude that the initial monopolist buys the licence at a price p 1 = (jI 1 j + 1 ) .
The strategic problem of the incumbents is somewhat di erent w h e n jI 1 j > 0.
Since incumbent's valuations are not uniquely de ned in this case, Lemma 3 implies that all the bids between 0 and (jI 1 j) ; (jI 1 j + 1 ) are undominated for each incumbent. Note that due to the presence of externalities the undominated Nash equilibrium allocation may benon-unique. For instance, when I 1 = f1 2g and (2) > 2 (3) the new entrants' valuations are between the two possible valuations of each incumbent. A public good problem between the incumbents arises: an incumbent will buy the licence and preempt entry if and only if the other incumbent abstains from doing it himself. Consequently, there are two u ndominated Nash equilibrium allocations, a di erent incumbent buying the unit at a price equal to (3) in each one of them. However, condition A 2 rules out the possibility of non-uniqueness by ensuring that the uniquely de ned valuation of the potential new entrants is larger than bothpossible valuations of the incumbents, so the valuations exhibit Determinate High Values in this case. According to Lemma 4 all the undominated Nash equilibria result in the same allocation: a tie-breaker decides which e n trant gets the licence and the winner pays an amount equal to (3) :
The Sequential Auction: Main Results
In this subsection I examine in detail the sequential auctions of licences emphasizing the connection between the outcome of the auction and the resulting market structure. The preceding discussion of Example 2 provides a simple illustration of some fundamental insights. The entry preemption paradigm claims that a monopolist always has incentive to preempt entry by buying either licences or capacity. It argues that since total pro ts decrease with entry becauseof the appearance of competition in the market, the decrease in the monopolist's pro ts due to entry is larger than the increase in the pro ts of the new entrants. Consequently, the monopolist will outbid potential entrants in any static, once-and-for-all sale. However, the persistence of monopoly does not generally extend to the case of markets where other forms of imperfect competition prevail. As we have seen in the context of Example 2, a Cournot oligopoly may allow entry in the auction of a single licence. Although entry reduces the aggregate pro ts of the oligopoly, unlike the monopoly case these pro ts are not appropriated by a single oligopolist therefore, none of them receives the full blow of the reduction. In fact, if pro ts do not decrease too fast, the decrease in pro ts expected by e a c h incumbent rm if entry occurs may be smaller than the increase expected by new entrants, so entry will occur in this case.
Since the concept of MRU equilibrium reduces the analysis of the sequential auction to the one of a recursively de ned sequence of single-unit auctions, the preceding observations about single unit auctions are directly relevant to the analysis of the more general case. The following remarks highlight the relationship between static and dynamic cases.
First, note that the instability of an oligopoly facing entry extends to the dynamic case: the last stage of a sequential auction is in fact a single-unit auction involving an oligopoly, and according to Example 2, entry will occur as long as condition A 2 is satis ed. In fact, a simple recursive argument shows that entry occurs in every stage. We conclude that if some competition is present, it will expand.
The question of persistence or stability of a monopoly that faces entry in a dynamic setting is somewhat more involved. However, an immediate insight follows directly from the preceding paragraph: if entry ever occurs we will be dealing with an auction that involves an oligopoly thereafter, so entry will continue to occur thereafter. Potential entrants know t h a t w ere they to succeed in obtaining a licence in stage s, e n try would continue to occur and t ; s + 2 rms would end up in the market after the auction. Thus, they are willing to o er the amount (t ; s + 2 ) for the sth unit. Consequently, if a monopolist that has already preempted ent r y u p t o t h e rth stage wishes to preempt entry completely, h e has to pay an amount equal to P t s=r (t ; s + 2 ) = P t;r+2 =2 ( ) for the remaining licences. Moreover, since a monopolist that preempts entry completely will make an amount (1) in gross pro ts, we conclude that the bene t of complete preemption is (1) ; P t;r+2 =2 ( ) : On the other hand, if the monopolist allows entry in the rth stage, entry will continue thereafter and he will end up making (t ; r + 2 ) in pro ts. Restricting our attention to the alternative between buying the remaining units or allowing entry immediately, we can talk unambiguously of the net bene t to a monopolist that has already preempted r units of preempting the remaining units, which w e de ne as the di erence between the bene ts associated to the preceding alternative, say Proposition 1 Consider the auction games described in section 2. Both for a S FPAand for the corresponding S S PA , the MRU allocation is unique and satis es the following properties:
(i) Suppose that both jI 1 j = 1 and t (1) > 0. Then jI t+1 j = 1 and p = (t ; + 2 ) for all 2 T. (ii) Suppose that either jI 1 j > 1 or t (1) < 0. Then jI t+1 j = jI 1 j + t and p = (jI 1 j + t), for all 2 T : (iii) Suppose that jI 1 j = 1 and t (1) = 0: Then there is a tie-breaker for the rst unit. If i 2 I 1 is selected we are in case (i). Otherwise, we are in case
(ii).
The following example illustrates the last result.
Example 3 (Two-Stage Second Price Auction) We consider the same environment as in Example 2 except that now two licences are auctioned sequentially. Suppose that I 1 = f1g. To nd the MRU a l l o cation we proceed r ecursively.
Since the last stage is a static auction, we know from Example 2 that if rm 1 obtains the rst licence, it will also obtain the second one at a price p 2 = (2) : Thus, rm 1's expected p ayo gross of the rst period's payment is (1); (2) if it buys the rst licence. We also know that if entry occurs in the rst stage, entry will occur again in the second one as a consequence of assumption A 2 . Thus, if a new entrant i buys the rst licence, both i and 1 have an expected payo gross of rst period payments equal to (3) : These observations imply that the recursive valuation of the rst unit to rm 1 is v 1 (h 1 ) = (1); (2); (3). Now consider the case of a potential entrant i. If he obtains the rst unit, entry will occur again in the second stage, so i's payo gross of the rst period's payment is (3) : If i fails to obtain the rst unit two scenarios are possible: either rm 1 gets it or some other entrant gets it. In the rst case, rm 1 will preempt entry completely so rm i ends up with no licence at all and zero pro ts. Finally, if some other entrant j gets the rst unit, rm i has a positive probability of getting the second unit at a price p 2 = (3). However, since entry occurs twice i n t h i s c ase, rm i's expect payo gross of the rst period's payment will be (3) ; (3) = 0 anyway.
We conclude that the recursive valuation of the rst unit to a potential entrant i is v i (h 1 ) = (3). Since all the recursive valuations are uniquely de ned, they are the only locally undominated bids for each bidder in the rst stage according to Lemma 4 . Moreover, note that v 1 (h 1 ) ;v i (h 1 ) = (1) ; (2) ;2 (3) = 2 (1).
Generically, either one of two cases may arise. When 2 (1) > 0 rm 1 is the high value player so it obtains both units at prices p 1 = (3) and p 2 = (2). When 2 (1) < 0 all the potential entrants are high value players so the tie breaker decides which one obtains the rst licence at price p 1 = (3) : According with Example 2, in the second stage, another new entrant obtains the second unit at the same price.
Proposition 1 extends and quali es the entry preemption insights derived from a static formulation. It con rms the idea that oligopolies would allow e n try but severely quali es the presumption that a monopolist would always have an incentive to avoid entry. It should be stressed that the limits of the analysis are clearly associated to the validity of assumptions A 1 and, particularly, A 2 : However, as we have seen in section 2, the assumptions are satis ed by some interesting market games.
In fact, in the particular case in which the post-auction market game is the symmetric Cournot game described in that section, somewhat sharper predictions can beobtained. Consider an environment in which a single monopolist faces a large numberof potential entrants. We know that if a single unit is auctioned, the monopolist always preempts entry. The question is whether the monopolist would ever abandon his preemptive behavior to allow e n try if a su ciently large numberof units is o ered. The following corollary of Proposition 1 shows that if a su ciently large numberof licences is auctioned, new entry occurs in every stage. Let N denote the set of the natural numbers, and also denote t 0 = supft 2 N : t (1) > 0g. Corollary 1 Consider the case in which N = N and jI 1 j = 1 : Suppose that the post-auction market game is the Cournot game described in section 2 and that the market demand satis es assumption M 2 . Then (i) If t t 0 then jI t+1 j = 1 . Otherwise, jI t+1 j = jI 1 j + t.
(ii) Suppose also that p satis es assumption M 2 . Then t 0 < 1.
Proof. (i) Just notice that t+1 (1) ; t (1) = (t + 1 ) ; 2 (t + 2 ) < 0 by A 2 , and then apply Proposition 1.
(ii) Lemma 2 implies that (1) < 1+r 2 2 (r) f o r r = 2 3 : : . Thus, using the fact that This result contrasts sharply with the static case. It suggests that by auctioning sequentially a su ciently large numberof licences, a government can ensure the competitiveness of the resulting market. But will the government or, more generally, a seller actually do that? Suppose that the seller aims at maximizing his own revenue. Let R t denote the seller's revenue associated to the MRU allocation of the sequential auction of t units and lett denote the numberof units that maximizes that revenue. The following characterization of this revenue is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1: (ii) In view of part (i) we only need to consider the case of t 0 2 t. Note that by assumption R 2 ; R t = 2 (3) ; t (t + 1 ) > 0 when t 0 = 1, and R 2 ; R t = (2) + (3) ; t (t + 1 ) 2 (3) ; t (t + 1 ) > 0 when t 0 = 2. The conclusion follows.
(iii) It follows directly from Example 1 and part (ii). 2
In other words, this result identi es cases in which a revenue maximizing seller prefers to sell less than the number of licences or capacity units that would beconsistent with new entry. In particular, this will bethe case whenever the largest numberof units consistent with the monopoly solution, i.e.: t 0 , is larger than two. In fact, even when that number is equal to two, the seller may c hoose not to encourage competition, an example of which is the linear demand case. Thus, although it is always possible to encourage competition by auctioning a su ciently large number of units, the possibility that complete preemption occurs should not beneglected.
Remark: The Bertrand Case
Let us brie y consider the case in which the post-auction market game is a symmetric Bertrand game with constant returns to scale technology. In particular, if a single incumbent preempts entry completely, it will set prices so as to obtain the monopoly level of pro ts (1) > 0: On the other hand, if entry occurs, price competition will drive total industry pro ts to zero, i.e.: (m) = 0 f o r m > 1.
Although this case does not exactly satisfy assumptions A 1 and A 2 , it is a limiting case of the class of problems that satisfy these assumptions. Nonetheless, the characterization of the MRU allocation of the corresponding sequential auction is almost immediate in the present case. First note that if there is more than one incumbent at the beginning of stage r, i.e.: jI r j > 1, both incumbents and potential entrants expect to make zero pro ts in whatsoever market emerges from the auctions. Consequently, everybody's recursive valuation must bezero, so the tie breaker decides who obtains the licence at a price equal to zero. Supposenow that I r = f1g: Arguing recursively, suppose that if rm 1 buys the rth unit it will also buy the remaining units at a price approximately equal to zero obtaining expected pro ts equal to (1). Since rm 1's expected pro ts are zero if an entrant obtains the rth unit, we must conclude that its recursive valuation for the rth unit is (1). But then rm 1 will also obtain the rth unit at a price approximately equal to zero. The following result follows.
Proposition 2 Consider the case jI 1 j = 1 : Suppose that the post-auction market game is a symmetric Bertrand game with constant returns to scale technology. Then a single rm preempts entry completely.
Conclusion
Many of the insights about entry preemption and persistence of monopoly that had initially been formulated in a static framework were reexamined here in a dynamic setting through an analysis of sequential auctions of licences. The ndings extend and partly contrast with those initial insights. When the postauction market game is a symmetric Cournot game, entry will occur repeatedly as long as a su ciently large number of units is auctioned. However, a monopoly could still persist if for some reason the seller does not o er a number of units large enough. One possible reason is that in some cases to sell a large number of units is not revenue maximizing. The persistence of monopoly also extends to the dynamic case when the post-auction market game is a Bertrand game, which is only a limiting case of the class of problems studied here. These ndings also qualify and extend the results of Krishna 4] to the case in which the post-auction market game is symmetric.
I use a new solution concept that makes the analysis remarkably simple and provides a solution that is bothindependent of whether the selling procedure is a rst or a second price sequential auction and completely determinate as long as externalities play a limited role. Although the assumption that externalities are small appears compelling in the class of economic environments studied here, future research should extend the analysis of sequential auctions to environments involving externalities, non-separability a n d incomplete information. Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Lemma 3(i) implies that b i < v i with probability 1, for every i 2 N. Let b 1 denote the lowest bid that 1 uses with positive probability. If b 1 < v 2 with positive probability, t h e n player 2 will rather outbid b 1 with probability 1 . (To simplify the notation I have omitted the non-generic case in which t (1) = 0 although the extension is immediate. I h a ve also omitted reference to the strategy in u ir (h r ) and v ij (h r )). The proof of this result is recursive. The main steps are contained in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5 (ii) Suppose that either jI r j > 1 or t (r + 1 ) < 0. Then v ij (h r ) = 0 when i 2 I r and j 2 I r v ij (h r ) = (jI r j + t ; r) ; (jI r j + t ; r + 1 ) when i 2 I r and j = 2 I r v ij (h r ) = (jI r j + t ; r + 1 ) when i = 2 I r Proof. First suppose that both jI r j = 1 and t (r + 1 ) > 0: If a r 2 I r then I r+1 = I r . Thus, as a consequence of the hypothesis jI t+1 j = 1 and p = (t ; + 2 ) for all r: Similarly, i f a r = 2 I r then jI t+1 j = jI r j + t ; r + 1 and a 2 I r and p = (jI r j + t ; r + 1) for all r. Thus, u i r+1 (h r+1 ) = (1) ; P t;r+1 =2 ( ) if both i 2 I r and a r 2 I r u i r+1 (h r+1 ) = (t ; r + 2 ) if either a r = i = 2 I r or both i 2 I r and a r = 2 I r u i r+1 (h r+1 ) = 0 if both a r 6 = i and i = 2 I r Part (i) follows by substituting in the de nition of the recursive values at r.
Suppose now that either jI r j > 1 or t (r + 1 ) < 0. The hypothesis implies that u i r+1 (h r+1 ) = (jI r+1 j + t ; r). Again, part (ii) follows by substituting in the de nition. 2 Lemma 6 Suppose that the recursive values at r associated t o a n M R U a l l o cation satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 5. Then the MRU a l l o cation must satisfy conditions (a) and (b) at every h r 2 H r .
Proof. Suppose that both jI r j = 1 a n d t (r) > 0: Since t (r) ; t (r + 1 ) = (t ; r + 1 ) ; 2 (t ; r + 2 ) < 0 for r < t by A 2 , we have that t (r + 1 ) > 0:
Thus, by condition (i) of Lemma 5 the recursive v alues at r display Determinate High Values and also v i (h r ) ; v j (h r ) = t (r) > 0 when i 2 I r and j = 2 I r . Using Lemma 4 to analyze the local auction at r, we conclude that a r 2 I r and p r = (t ; r + 2). This establishes part (i).
Suppose now that either jI r j > 1 or t (r) < 0. Note that r < t since t (t) = (1) ; 2 (2) > 0 by A 1 : Since t ( ) is increasing in we only need to consider the following cases. When bothjI r j = 1 and t (r + 1 ) > 0 > t (r) condition (i) of Lemma 5 implies that the recursive values at r display Determinate High Values and that v i (h r ) ; v j (h r ) = t (r) < 0 if i 2 I r and j = 2 I r :
Thus, in this case Lemma 4 implies that a r = 2 I r and p r = (jI r j + t ; r + 1), as desired. Finally, when either jI r j > 1 or t (r + 1 ) < 0, condition (ii) of Lemma 5 and assumption A 2 imply that, for i 2 I r and j = 2 I r we have that v i (h r ) ; v j (h r ) = (jI r j + t ; r) ; 2 (jI r j + t ; r + 1 ) < 0: Since by assumption n > t , we conclude that the recursive values at r display Determinate High Values. Thus, Lemma 4 implies that a r = 2 I r and p r = (jI r j + t ; r + 1), as desired. 2
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, note that Lemma 5 shows that if the conditions (a)-(b) are satis ed after the rth stage then the recursive valuations at r associated with the MRU allocation must satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 5. But then Lemma 6 implies that the conditions (a)-(b) are satis ed also at r, as desired. 2
